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	The	 international	 crisis	 that	 began	 in	2007-2008	and	 the	 subsequent	 financial	difficulties	that	it	brought	about	have	produced	negative	effects	of	a	general	kind	on	European	economies,	imposing	particular	strains	on	the	Southern	European	ones.	While	the	analyses	of	observers	have	focused	on	the	consequences	of,	and	responses	to,	the	crisis,	the	impact	on	National	Innovation	Systems	has	still	not	been	 the	 subject	 of	 much	 study.	 However,	 one	 issue	 which	 deserves	 close	attention	is	the	effects	that	the	sharp	fall	in	demand	and	the	policies	of	austerity	have	 produced	 on	 the	 actions	 of	 governments	 and	 private	 companies	 in	fostering	innovation1.	A	crucial	aspect	to	investigate	in	this	particular	context	is	the	kind	of	anti-conjunctural	policies	adopted	 in	Southern	European	countries,	distinguishing	 between	 proactive	 measures	 (with	 a	 growing	 investment	 of	resources	in	training	and	research	and	a	policy	mix	of	innovation	support)	and	activities	of	a	more	defensive	nature	(with	a	contraction	of	resources	invested	in	innovation).	 In	 other	 words,	 it	 is	 important	 to	 understand	 if,	 and	 with	 what	results,	 these	 countries	 have	 exploited	 the	 crisis	 to	 embark	 on	 a	 strategy	 to	ensure	long-term	growth	and	to	stimulate	their	economies.			The	 article	 deals	 specifically	 with	 three	 Southern	 European	 countries:	Italy,	 Portugal	 and	 Spain	 (hereafter	 SE3).	 These	 countries	 have	 long	 been	
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considered	 Moderate	 Innovators,	 and	 they	 still	 achieve	 modest	 innovative	performances	 (European	Commission	 2016).	However,	 during	 the	 crisis,	 in	 all	the	 three	economies	both	 the	percentage	of	 companies	 introducing	product	or	process	innovations	and	the	share	of	sales	related	to	newly	introduced	products	have	been	 similar	or	 even	 superior	 to	 the	averages	of	 the	EU	countries.	These	unexpected	results	make	the	SE3	an	interesting	case	for	analysing	responses	to	the	crisis:	in	fact,	they	represent	a	sort	of	‘South	European	Paradox’	because	SE3	companies	 have	 been	 able	 to	 introduce	 some	 kind	 of	 innovation	 despite	 the	weaknesses	 of	 the	 National	 Innovation	 Systems	 and	 the	 adverse	 economic	conjuncture.	 The	 article	 aims	 to	 shed	 light	 on	 this	 paradox	 and	 proceeds	 as	follows.	In	the	next	section,	we	will	introduce	the	topic,	addressing	it	in	a	frame	typical	of	a	comparative	political	economy	analysis.	The	third	section	is	devoted	to	the	presentation	of	SE3	National	Innovation	Systems	(henceforth	NIS),	paying	attention	to	some	key	features	characterising	these	countries	and	affecting	their	capacity	for	innovation.	The	fourth	section	presents	responses	to	the	economic	crisis	as	regards	both	measures	adopted	by	governments	and	strategies	pursued	by	 private	 companies.	 There,	 and	 also	 in	 the	 conclusions,	 we	 provide	 some	explanations	 of	 the	 ‘South	 European	 Paradox’,	 drawing	 attention	 to	 the	‘generative	dynamics’	and	the	‘creative	processes’	that	have	occurred	during	the	crisis.		
Economic	crisis	and	innovation	in	Italy,	Portugal	and	Spain	The	 impact	 of	 the	 international	 crisis	 on	 the	 innovation	 performances	 of	European	economies	has	only	 recently	become	a	matter	 for	 reflection.	 Several	international	organizations	have	carried	out	macro-level	analyses,	using	pooled	data	and	publishing	regular	reports	that	monitor	the	performance	and	trends	of	NIS	 (European	 Commission	 2011,	 2012,	 2013a,	 2013b,	 2014a,	 2015,	 2016;	OECD	 2002,	 2004,	 2006,	 2008,	 2010,	 2012).	Works	 of	 a	more	 academic	 kind,	however,	have	predominantly	adopted	a	more	micro-level	approach	focused	on	analyses	 of	 the	 behaviour	 of	 companies	 in	 different	 economic	 sectors	 and	territorial	contexts	(Kuznetsov	&	Simachev	2010;	Antonioli	et	al.	2011;	Filippetti	&	 Archibugi	 2011;	 Archibugi	 &	 Filippetti	 2012;	 Paunov	 2012;	 Archibugi,	Filippetti	&	Frenz	2013).	Overall,	 these	studies	have	addressed	the	question	of	the	 impact	 of	 the	 crisis	 on	 the	 innovative	 capacity	 of	 the	 various	 national	economies	 and	 drawn	 some	 general	 conclusions:	 a)	 government	 policies	 have	basically	followed	a	countercyclical	path	(they	have	not,	in	other	words,	reduced	resources	 during	 the	 crisis);	 b)	 the	 crisis	 has	 had	 a	 differentiated	 impact	 on	national	economies,	productive	sectors,	and	the	various	types	of	company.		Despite	these	studies,	however,	we	still	know	little	about	what	has	happened	in	 the	 NIS	 of	 Southern	 Europe.	 But,	 what	 are	 NIS?	 The	 use	 of	 this	 concept	 is	relatively	 recent	 in	 the	 field	 of	 Innovation	 Studies	 (Freeman	 1987;	 Dosi	 et	 al.	1988;	Lundvall	1992;	Nelson	1993).	It	was	introduced	in	the	1980s	and	refers	to	‘all	 important	economic,	 social,	political,	 organizational,	 institutional	and	other	
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factors	that	influence	the	development,	diffusion	and	use	of	innovation’	(Edquist	1997,	14).	Despite	substantial	differences,	certain	basic	features	are	common	to	studies	using	this	concept	(see	Ramella	2016).	First,	the	idea	that	knowledge	and	learning	processes	are	key	drivers	of	development.	Second,	the	abandonment	of	a	 strictly	 economistic	 view	 of	 innovation,	 with	 the	 realisation	 that:	 (a)	innovation	requires	the	contribution	of	a	plurality	of	actors,	both	economic	and	otherwise	 (companies,	 universities,	 governments,	 etc.);	 (b)	 institutions	play	 an	important	role	 in	shaping	the	context	 in	which	these	actors	operate.	Third,	 the	recognition	 that	 these	 processes	 are	 embedded	 in	 networks	 of	 relationships	between	people	and	organisations	(Edquist	2005;	Ramella	2016).		This	article	analyses	SE3	 innovative	performance	amid	the	current	crisis	by	starting	 from	 the	 idea	 that	 Italy,	 Portugal	 and	 Spain	 share	 a	 number	 of	characteristics	that	define	a	specific	type	of	NIS.	As	will	be	seen,	the	most	salient	feature	 is	 their	 weakness:	 as	 shown	 by	 the	 data	 of	 the	 European	 Innovation	Scoreboard	(European	Commission	2016),	all	these	countries	are	included	in	the	‘Moderate	 Innovators’	 group,	 with	 performances	 below	 the	 EU	 average.	 A	second	 distinctive	 feature	 concerns	 their	 productive	 structure	 and	 the	institutional	 architecture	 that	 sustains	 it:	 these	 three	 countries	 are	 all	 under-specialised	 in	 high-tech	 sectors	 and	 have	 a	 high	 endowment	 of	 small	 and	medium-sized	 enterprises.	 They	 also	 display	 low	 investment	 in	 research,	 a	limited	propensity	to	patent,	and	a	number	of	critical	issues	in	the	regulation	of	economic	activities.		If	we	observe	 the	behaviour	of	 companies,	 however,	 a	 less	dismal	 situation	becomes	 apparent.	 In	 fact,	 as	 regards	 the	 percentage	 of	 innovative	 small	 and	medium-sized	enterprises	 (SMEs)	and	sales	related	 to	new	products,	 the	 three	countries	 perform	 in	 a	 manner	 similar	 to,	 or	 even	 better	 than,	 the	 European	average.	This	data	 thus	highlight	 a	kind	of	paradox:	 SE3	 companies	have	been	able	 to	 create	 innovation	 despite	 the	 constraints	 –	 both	 structural	 and	conjunctural	–	that	characterise	their	national	systems	and	the	lack	of	resources	invested	 in	 R&D.	 	 This	 article	 therefore	 aims	 to	 shed	 light	 on	 this	 paradox	 by	analysing:	 1)	 the	 specific	 characteristics	 of	 the	 three	 NIS;	 2)	 the	 behaviour	 of	companies	during	the	 international	crisis;	3)	the	 ‘generative	dynamics’	and	the	‘creative	 processes’	 that	 have	 taken	 place	 during	 the	 crisis,	 with	 particular	attention	 paid	 to	 the	 Italian	 situation	 (i.e.	 to	 the	 main	 Southern	 European	manufacturing	 economy),	 which	 will	 provide	 the	 fulcrum	 for	 our	 final	considerations.							The	article	follows	a	pattern	typical	of	comparative	political	economy.	As	well	known,	 the	debate	on	varieties	of	capitalism	(Hancke	2009;	Burroni	2016)	has	underlined	 the	 link	 between	 systems	 of	 regulation	 and	 regimes	 of	 innovation.	Hall	 and	 Soskice	 (2001),	 for	 example,	 outlined	 two	 ideal-typical	 models	 of	contemporary	 capitalism.	 On	 the	 one	 hand,	 coordinated	 market	 economies,	which	 are	 associated	 with	 a	 regime	 of	 incremental	 innovation	 and	 a	specialisation	 in	productive	sectors	with	a	 relatively	slow	rate	of	 technological	
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change	 (slow-tech):	 for	 example,	 the	 mechanical	 engineering	 industry,	transport,	 and	 durable	 consumer	 goods.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 liberal	 market	economies,	 which	 are	 associated	 with	 a	 regime	 of	 radical	 innovation	 and	 a	specialisation	 in	 sectors	 that	 feature	 rapid	 technological	 change	 (fast-tech)	 –	such	 as	 biotechnology,	 semi-conductors,	 information	 –	 or	 in	 activities	 that	require	ongoing	innovation,	such	as	entertainment	and	advertising.		From	our	point	of	view,	the	debate	on	varieties	of	capitalism	and	in	particular	on	 SE3	 –	 often	 described	 as	 ‘mixed	 market	 economies’	 (Molina	 and	 Rhodes	2007)	and	related	to	the	category	of	 ‘Mediterranean	capitalism’	(Amable	2003;	Sapir	2005;	Burroni	2016)	–	can	be	enriched	by	reflection	on	the	characteristics	of	their	NIS	(Ramella	2016).	SE3	economies,	in	fact,	also	have	their	own	regimes	of	innovation	which	take	some	features	of	the	incremental	version	to	extremes.	Their	 NIS,	 however,	 are	 not	 simply	 weaker	 variants	 of	 those	 of	 coordinated	economies;	 rather,	 they	 have	 their	 own	distinctive	 characteristics.	 As	we	 shall	see	in	the	following	section,	Italy,	Portugal	and	Spain	possess	a	unique	mix	based	on	the	one	hand	on	a	lack	of	collective	goods	and	resources	for	innovation	and,	on	the	other,	on	greater	state	involvement	and	weak	relations	between	actors	in	the	system.	Moreover,	as	we	shall	argue	in	the	third	section,	these	features	have	produced	 perverse	 effects	 in	 their	 economies,	 they	 have:	 a)	 reduced	competitiveness	 and	 innovative	 potential;	 b)	 made	 those	 economies	 more	vulnerable	 during	 the	 international	 crisis,	 due	 to	 retrenchment	 in	 the	 public	sector.	However,	in	the	business	sector,	the	crisis	has	also	triggered	‘generative	dynamics’	that	can	stimulate	a	rethinking	of	the	competitive	strategies	that	have	been	followed	in	recent	decades.			
Methods	and	data	This	 section	briefly	outlines	 the	methods	and	data	 that	will	be	discussed	 in	those	that	follow.	As	said	above,	the	focus	is	on	Italy,	Portugal	and	Spain,	i.e.	the	three	main	Southern	EU	economies.	Another	important	country,	namely	Greece,	has	 been	 omitted	 from	 the	 analysis,	 since	 the	 sovereign	 debt	 crisis	 in	 that	country	was	of	such	magnitude	as	to	make	the	economic	and	political	dynamics	that	followed	entirely	idiosyncratic.		In	what	 follows,	we	propose	an	analysis	of	SE3	NIS	and	 their	performances	that	takes	different	types	of	secondary	sources	into	consideration.	A	first	crucial	source	is	the	European	Innovation	Scoreboard,	an	annual	study	promoted	by	the	European	 Commission	 since	 2001:	 its	 purpose	 is	 to	 provide	 an	 overview	 on	economic	 innovation	 and	 a	 comparative	 analysis	 of	 the	 EU	 NIS	 by	 processing	primary	 data	 from	 Eurostat,	 OECD	 and	 the	 United	 Nations.	 The	 innovative	performances	 of	 individual	 countries	 are	 classified	 and	 compared	 using	 an	indicator	 –	 the	 Summary	 Innovation	 Index	 –	 that	 sums	 up	 the	 scores	 on	 25	indicators	 relating	 to	 three	 different	 aspects:	 the	 relevant	 inputs	 to	 the	innovation	 process	 (Enablers);	 innovative	 strategies	 at	 a	 company	 level	 (Firm	
activities);	innovation	outputs	(Outputs)	(European	Commission	2015).		
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In	 the	 next	 sections,	 we	will	 also	 introduce	 some	 secondary	 data	 from	 the	World	 Bank:	 in	 this	 case,	 we	 consider	 indicators	 related	 to	 ‘governance’	 and	‘doing	business’.	These	are	two	dimensions	of	key	importance	for	understanding	the	 quality	 of	 regulatory	 capacity	 and	 the	 system’s	 efficiency	 in	 a	 given	institutional	 context.	 Here,	 a	 certain	 level	 of	 both	 is	 assumed	 to	 be	 the	precondition	for	realizing	a	country’s	 full	 innovative	and	economic	potential.	A	third	 relevant	 source	 is	 the	 Community	 Innovation	 Survey	 (CIS),	 conducted	every	 two	 years	 (since	 2004)	 by	 Eurostat	 and	 the	 statistical	 offices	 of	 EU	countries.	It	gathers	information	on	innovation	processes	in	European	industry	and	service	companies	with	at	least	10	employees.	The	survey	is	by	sample	for	companies	with	10	to	249	employees	and	by	census	for	those	with	at	least	250	employees.	It	will	help	us	to	reconstruct	the	behaviour	of	firms	during	the	crisis.			In	 the	 fourth	 section,	we	will	 take	 into	 account	 other	 data	 provided	 by	 the	statistical	office	of	the	European	Union	(Eurostat)	in	order	to	show	the	effects	of	the	 crisis	 on	 national	 policies	 and	 private	 companies.	 Further	 data	 from	 the	Italian	Central	Statistical	Institute	(Istat)	will	be	presented	when	we	focus	on	the	case	of	Italy.		
National	Innovation	Systems	in	Southern	Europe		Besides	certain	differences,	the	NIS	of	SE3	share	a	number	of	features	that	–	compared	 to	 other	 European	 countries	 –	 define	 a	 specific	 ‘Southern	 Europe	model’.	These	 features	can	be	reconstructed	by	referring	 to	evidence	provided	by	the	European	Innovation	Scoreboard.	Confirming	the	picture	that	emerged	in	previous	versions,	the	most	recent	report	classifies	SE3	as	Moderate	Innovators,	in	that	a	number	of	 indicators	rank	their	 innovative	performances	significantly	below	 the	 EU	 average	 (Innovation	 Index	 equal	 to	 0.52).	 In	 this	 classification,	Italy	 (0.43)	 is	placed	seventeenth,	Portugal	 (0.42)	eighteenth,	and	Spain	(0.36)	twentieth	(European	Commission	2016).	The	scores	lie	a	long	way	behind	those	achieved	 by	 the	 historical	 quartet	 of	 Innovation	 Leader	 countries	 –	 Sweden	(0.70),	 Denmark	 (0.70),	 Finland	 (0.65)	 and	 Germany	 (0.63)	 –	 which	 can	represent	benchmarks	useful	for	determining	the	critical	issues	and	weaknesses	of	the	three	cases	that	we	examine	most	closely2.		It	 should	 also	 be	 considered	 that,	 although	 the	 classification	 is	 periodically	updated,	 repositioning	 is	usually	 infrequent.	A	diachronic	 reading	of	all	 the	28	EU	 member	 states	 shows	 a	 situation	 virtually	 unchanged	 in	 recent	 years.	However,	 this	 evidence	 is	 not	 the	 outcome	 of	 a	 widespread	 and	 generalised	condition	of	stasis;	rather,	it	is	the	combinatorial	effect	of	a	variety	of	situations:	in	fact,	although	the	negative	consequences	of	the	economic	crisis	have	affected	all	 EU	 countries,	 from	 the	point	 of	 view	of	 innovation	 some	have	been	able	 to	improve	their	score	while	others	have	remained	unchanged	or	even	worsened.		All	this	has	taken	place	in	a	general	framework	(referring	to	the	period	2008-2015)	in	which	most	of	the	worst-performing	countries	have	been	able	to	grow	even	 beyond	 the	 average,	 in	 contrast	 to	 the	 Leaders	 –	 with	 the	 exception	 of	
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Denmark	–	which	have	a	mild	negative	trend	(Finland)	or	continue	to	advance	but	 at	 a	 slower	 pace	 (Sweden,	 Germany).	 The	 result	 is	 an	 intermittent	 and	discontinuous	 process	 of	 convergence	 among	 the	 performances	 of	 the	 various	EU	 countries	which	was	 already	 apparent	 before	 2011.	 This	 first	 convergence	was	 followed	 by	 a	 setback	 in	 2012.	 It	 resumed	 between	 2013	 and	 2014,	 and	then	halted	again	in	2015.	At	present,	the	catching-up	process	already	apparent	in	the	past	seems	to	be	underway,	although	its	development	is	taking	place	in	a	more	varied	and	contradictory	panorama	(European	Commission	2014a,	2015,	2016).			Bearing	 these	 background	 trends	 in	 mind,	 we	 now	 go	 more	 deeply	 into	 the	reasons	 for	 the	 low	 innovative	 performances	 of	 the	 SE3.	 Through	 the	 use	 of	several	indicators,	we	will	first	illustrate	the	weak	aspects	of	their	NIS,	and	then	focus	 on	 the	 institutional	 architecture	 and	 the	 lack	 of	 regulatory	 capacity	 in	these	countries.			
	
The	Weakness	of	Southern	European	NIS		As	mentioned	above,	a	main	feature	shared	by	Italy,	Portugal	and	Spain	is	above	all	the	weakness	of	their	NIS.	Their	scores	are	below	the	European	average	on	at	least	 three	 fronts:	 i)	 investments	 in	 qualified	 human	 capital	 and	 ongoing	training;	 ii)	 the	 financial	 resources	 allocated	 to	 research	 and	 development	activities;	 iii)	 inter-organisational	 partnerships	 that	 foster	 innovation	 through	cooperative	 learning	 processes	 that	 promote	 the	 circulation	 and	 exchange	 of	knowledge.	With	 regard	 to	 the	 first	 point,	 although	 with	 some	 differences	 among	 the	individual	 countries,	 there	 emerges	 a	 negative	 spread	 with	 reference	 to	investment	 in	 training:	 a	 backwardness	 found	 at	 all	 levels	 but	which	becomes	even	more	 pronounced	 in	 higher	 education.	 A	 general	 reading	 shows	 that	 the	ratios	to	GDP	of	public	spending	on	education	is	below	the	EU	average	(5.3	per	cent)	 both	 for	 Italy	 (4.3	per	 cent)	 and	 for	 Spain	 (4.2	per	 cent),	while	Portugal	(5.3	per	cent)	is	in	line	with	the	general	European	level.	For	tertiary	education,	however,	all	the	values	fall	below	the	European	average	(1.3	per	cent):	Italy	0.8	per	 cent,	 Spain	 1.0	 per	 cent,	 and	 Portugal	 0.9	 per	 cent	 (referring	 to	 2013	Eurostat	data).	If	we	then	focus	on	those	who	complete	university	education	and	those	 who	 complete	 their	 doctoral	 degree,	 the	 situation	 looks	 even	 gloomier,	especially	when	compared	to	that	of	the	Leader	countries	(Table	1).	It	should	be	remembered	that,	compared	to	an	EU	average	of	38.5	per	cent	of	young	people	between	25	and	34	with	a	university	degree,	Italy	(24.9	per	cent)	and	Portugal	(31.3	 per	 cent)	 –	 Spain	 (41.1	 per	 cent)	 is	 the	 exception	 here	 –	 seem	 to	 be	 in	serious	difficulties	(2015	Eurostat	data).				 	
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Table	 1.	 National	 Innovation	 Systems	 in	 Italy,	 Portugal	 and	 Spain,	 compared	 to	 four	Innovation	Leader	countries	(EU28	=	100)	
	Source:	our	elaborations	on	Eurostat	data	-	European	Innovation	Scoreboard	2016	(European	Commission,	2016)		A	 second	 weakness	 relates	 to	 innovation	 funding.	 Even	 considering	 the	expenditure	on	R&D	relative	to	GDP,	the	position	of	the	SE3	is	well	below	the	EU	average	 (2.0	 per	 cent):	 in	 this	 ranking,	 Portugal	 (1.3	 per	 cent),	 Italy	 (1.3	 per	cent)	and	Spain	(1.2	per	cent)	are	very	close	together	in	terms	of	values	(2015	Eurostat	 data).	 The	 public	 sector	 unquestionably	 spends	 very	 little	 on	 R&D	compared	to	the	EU	average,	but	if	we	look	at	company	behaviour	and	compare	the	situation	with	that	of	the	Leader	countries,	the	gap	is	even	more	pronounced	(Table	 1).	 Added	 to	 these	 deficiencies	 is	 the	 decidedly	 more	 modest	 role	 of	private	 finance	 specialised	 in	 innovation.	 Not	 only	 is	 the	 impact	 of	 venture	capital	 funds	 on	GDP	 significantly	 lower	 than	 the	EU	 average,	 but	 the	 trend	 is	also	a	negative	one:	in	the	period	2007-2014	their	amount	–	in	absolute	terms	–	fell	 by	 about	 75	 per	 cent	 in	 Italy	 and	 67	 per	 cent	 in	 Spain.	 Even	 though	 in	Portugal	it	actually	grew	by	20	per	cent,	in	2014	it	still	stood	at	only	one	third	of	the	Italian	and	a	quarter	of	the	Spanish	total	(2007	to	2014	Eurostat	data).		A	 third	 element	 of	 weakness	 concerns	 the	 relational	 dynamics	 that	 link	companies	 to	 a	 plurality	 of	 actors	 and	 institutions	 –	 not	 only	 those	 in	 the	economic	 field	 –	 that	 collaborate	 in	 innovation	 processes.	 Companies	 are	increasingly	less	able	to	bear	the	costs	and	risks	of	innovative	projects	on	their	own,	 especially	 in	 times	 of	 crisis,	 so	 that	 partnerships	 with	 other	 companies,	universities	and	research	centres	have	become	essential.	In	this	regard,	the	last	two	indicators	presented	in	Table	1	once	again	provide	evidence	of	a	significant	backwardness	 in	 all	 the	 three	 countries:	 the	 first	 indicator	 refers	 to	 the	percentage	of	small	and	medium-sized	innovative	companies	that	have	initiated	cooperation	 with	 other	 external	 actors,	 while	 the	 second	 one	 refers	 to	 the	publications	 resulting	 from	 the	 collaboration	 between	 public	 and	 private	entities.	 More	 generally,	 the	 partnership	 problem	 emerges	 most	 clearly	 on	considering	 the	 data	 of	 the	 Community	 Innovation	 Survey	 concerning	 the	relations	 between	 innovative	 companies	 and	 strategic	 actors	 such	 as	universities	 and	 research	 and	 training	 institutions. On	 this	 front,	 too,	 the	performance	of	Southern	Europe	countries	is	worse	than	the	European	average	
Italy 65 83 75 55 35 47 53Portugal 81 171 92 45 110 66 21Spain 107 95 81 50 68 59 48Germany 83 152 126 150 78 112 157Finland 118 158 139 165 169 138 206Denmark 121 176 150 150 94 167 424Sweden 130 158 144 163 129 123 318
Population	completed	tertiary	 New	doctorate	graduates	 R&D	expenditure	public	sector R&D	expenditure	business	 Venture	capital	investments Innovative	SMEs	collaborating	 Public-private	co-publications
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(13.2	per	cent),	with	Spain	(10.9	per	cent)	and	Portugal	(9.2	per	cent),	however,	performing	a	little	better	than	Italy	(7.0	per	cent)	(CIS	2014).			
Institutional	Architectures	Compared	A	 further	 point	 to	 note	 is	 the	 specific	 institutional	 architecture	 that	characterises	the	SE3.	Given	that	our	reflections	on	the	NIS	follow	an	integrated	approach,	 attention	must	 be	 paid	 to	 the	 components	 of	 the	 system	 and	 to	 the	relationships	 that	 they	 have	 with	 one	 another	 (Lundvall	 1992;	 Nelson	 1993;	Edquist	 1997,	 2005).	 As	 well	 known,	 innovative	 dynamism	 is	 facilitated	 by	cooperation	 among	 a	 variety	 of	 actors	who	 possess	 complementary	 resources	(Ramella	 2016).	 Accordingly,	 it	 is	 appropriate	 to	 consider	 the	 innovative	capacity	of	 individual	countries	as	a	phenomenon	associated	not	only	with	 the	structural	 characteristics	 of	 their	 economies,	 but	 also	 with	 the	 quality	 of	 the	regulatory	 and	 institutional	 frameworks	 within	 which	 the	 actors	 operate.	Innovative	performance	thus	evolves	in	a	way	that	 is	partially	path-dependent,	since	it	is	influenced	by	the	institutional	architecture	of	the	NIS.	From	this	perspective,	 there	 is	a	clear	polarisation	between	 the	situation	 in	the	three	SE3	and	that	of	the	Innovation	Leaders.	The	latter	display	a	model	that	can	be	called	‘highly	integrated’.	As	shown	in	Graph	1,	these	are	NIS	a)	with	high	levels	of	per	capita	expenditure	in	R&D	and	b)	which	are	‘firm-centred’.	In	fact,	the	 contribution	made	 by	 the	 companies,	 compared	 to	 the	 total	 investment	 in	R&D,	is	above	the	European	average,	and	this	in	a	context	in	which	public	funds	for	 research	 and	 training	 are	 already	 very	 substantial.	 This	 model	 is	 also	characterized	by	a	 considerable	degree	of	 integration,	 since	 the	various	actors	participating	in	innovative	processes	have	relations	at	various	levels,	showing	a	high	 propensity	 for	 inter-organisational	 collaboration	 (Fagerberg,	 2016;	Gherardini	2015;	Fagerberg	&	Fosaas	2014;	Hedin	et	al.	2008).	This	is	combined	with	 a	 regime	 of	 innovation	 that	 is	more	 science-based,	 given	 the	 importance	that	 the	 sectors	 of	 high	 and	 medium-high	 technology	 have	 in	 the	 productive	structures	of	the	Leader	countries.														
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Graph	1.	The	architecture	of	 the	National	 Innovation	Systems	in	Italy,	Portugal	and	Spain	 in	2015	compared	to	four	Innovation	Leader	countries:	two	polar	opposites.	
	Source:	our	elaborations	on	2015	Eurostat	data.		In	marked	contrast	to	the	Leader	countries,	 Italy,	Portugal	and	Spain	NIS	are	‘weakly	integrated’,	with	private	enterprise	playing	a	far	less	important	role.	These	 low	 levels	of	 investment	are	connected	 to	 the	high	 fragmentation	of	 the	productive	structure	and,	in	part,	to	the	significantly	familial	nature	of	small	and	medium	 enterprises	 in	 SE3	 (Burroni	 2016).	 It	 is	 therefore	 a	 more	 ‘public-centred’	 type	 of	 system,	 even	 though,	 as	 already	 said,	 the	 public	 institutions	themselves	spend	comparatively	less	both	on	R&D	and	on	the	training	of	human	capital.	 In	 addition,	 the	 architecture	 of	 the	 model	 appears	 less	 textured	 (Cis	2012;	 Gherardini	 2015;	 Nunes	 et	 al.	 2013).	 Partnerships	 between	 actors	 are	more	 sporadic	 and	 are	 often	 structured	 around	 short-range	 relationships.	 In	some	of	these	countries,	in	fact,	the	territorial	dimension	is	extremely	important	for	the	social	construction	of	innovation.	In	contexts	of	this	kind,	the	use	of	new	technologies	 is	combined	with	 flexible	and	 localised	production	systems	based	on	 learning	 by	 doing	 (Bellandi	 1989).	 The	 innovation	 regime	 is	 therefore	
empirically-oriented:	 that	 is,	 it	 does	 not	 rely	 on	 codified	 knowledge	 and	formalized	R&D	activity.	With	 reference	 once	 again	 to	 the	 institutional	 context,	 it	 should	 also	 be	stressed	 that	 all	 SE3	display	 critical	 issues	 in	 terms	 of	 capacity	 for	 regulation.	The	 indicators	 developed	 by	 the	 World	 Bank	 relating	 to	 dimensions	 of	governance	 and	 ‘doing	 business’	 highlight	 significant	 problems	 in	 the	 quality	and	 efficiency	 of	 the	 institutional	 context	 (World	 Bank	 2014,	 2015).	 In	particular,	 the	 four	 dimensions	 of	 governance	 –	 ‘Government	 Effectiveness’,	‘Regulatory	Quality’,	 ‘Rule	of	Law’	and	 ‘Control	of	Corruption’	–	give	an	 idea	of	the	 competitive	 disadvantage	 of	 the	 three	 countries	 in	 comparison	 to	 the	
10 
 
situation	of	the	innovation	Leaders.	And	the	same	goes	for	the	 ‘doing	business’	index,	 which	makes	 it	 possible	 to	 evaluate	 the	 distance	 of	 Italy,	 Portugal	 and	Spain	 from	 the	 efficiency	 ‘frontier’	 –	 in	 other	 words,	 from	 those	 benchmark	countries	 which	 in	 various	 fields	 offer	 the	 best	 possible	 conditions	 for	 ‘doing	business’3.		The	 low	 quality	 of	 the	 institutional	 context	 and	 public	 regulation	 finds	immediate	confirmation	in	the	obstacles	encountered	by	companies	in	carrying	out	 their	 activities.	 A	 survey	 conducted	 in	 2014	 by	 Eurobarometer	 on	 12,000	companies	shows	that	over	three-quarters	of	them	in	Southern	Europe	countries	report	 difficulties	 in	 marketing	 their	 innovations	 –	 difficulties	 related	 to	 the	costs	 or	 the	 complexity	 of	 the	 regulations	 and	 standards	 required.	 Italy	 ranks	first	 in	 this	 negative	 European	 classification	 (with	 81	 per	 cent	 of	 companies	complaining	of	problems),	Portugal	second	(with	80	per	cent),	and	Spain	 third	(with	77	per	cent).	By	way	of	comparison,	 in	 the	Leader	countries	only	46	per	cent	of	companies	report	the	same	difficulties	(European	Commission	2014b,	p.	68).		
The	Effects	of	the	Crisis	What	 impact	 has	 the	 economic	 crisis	 had	 on	 Southern	 Europe	 countries?	 The	immediate	answer	is	that	the	fall	in	domestic	and	international	demand	and	the	austerity	policies	imposed	by	the	European	Union	have	exerted	a	braking	action.	They	have	interrupted	a	path	of	growth	and	catching-up	that	in	some	countries,	such	 as	 Spain,	 had	 in	 previous	 years	 been	 particularly	 intense.	 While	indisputably	 true	 in	 certain	 respects,	 this	 response	 –	 focused	 as	 it	 is	 only	 on	external	 shocks	 –provides	 a	 partial	 picture	 of	 the	 transformations	 that	 took	place	in	SE3.	That	 said,	 however,	 let	 us	 begin	 with	 the	 elements	 that	 confirm	 such	 an	exogenous	and	exclusively	disruptive	reading	of	the	crisis,	and	consider	the	data	provided	 by	 Eurostat4.	 On	 the	 economic	 front,	 the	 first	 point	 to	 note	 is	 the	significant	slowdown	in	GDP.	In	the	seven	years	prior	to	the	international	crisis	(2000-2007),	 the	 SE3	 economies	 grew	 overall	 by	 15	 per	 cent	 in	 real	 terms;	 a	figure	in	line	with	the	European	average	and	higher	than	that	of	the	innovation	Leader	countries.	Over	the	next	seven	years	(2007-2014),	however,	GDP	fell	by	7	per	 cent,	 while	 the	 rest	 of	 Europe	 registered	 a	 slight	 increase.	 In	 per	 capita	terms,	the	retrenchment	of	the	three	Southern	Europe	economies	is	even	more	obvious:	if	the	per	capita	GDP	of	the	EU	is	given	a	value	of	100,	in	2000	the	SE3	had	 a	 value	 of	 995.	 In	 2014,	 this	 fell	 to	 83.	 The	 most	 striking	 decline	 was	recorded	by	Italy,	which	went	from	a	value	of	120	to	one	of	98,	with	a	reduction	of	as	many	as	22	percentage	points.		Decline	in	investment	also	confirms	a	substantial	contraction	of	the	Southern	Europe	 economies.	 While	 in	 the	 previous	 seven	 years	 (2000-2007)	 the	accumulation	of	fixed	capital	grew	in	real	terms	at	a	rate	higher	(+27	per	cent)	
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than	the	European	average	(+21	per	cent)	and	that	of	the	Leader	countries	(+8	per	 cent),	 in	 the	 crisis	 years	 (2007-2014)	 the	 retrenchment	 shows	 a	 far	more	substantial	result:	-32	per	cent	as	against	the	EU	average	of	-12	per	cent	and	the	+2	per	cent	of	the	Leader	countries.	All	this	resulted	in	a	dramatic	reduction	in	employment.	In	the	pre-crisis	period,	employment	had	grown	in	SE3	much	more	than	the	European	average	(+17.3	per	cent	vs.	+6.9	per	cent),	especially	thanks	to	 the	 extraordinary	 performance	 of	 Spain	 (+33.3	 per	 cent).	 In	 the	 following	period,	however,	this	trend	underwent	a	sharp	reversal	(-9.3	per	cent	vs	-1.5	per	cent),	especially	 in	 the	case	of	Spain	(-15.8	per	cent)	and	 in	 the	manufacturing	sector	(SE3	-17.2	per	cent),	as	was	the	case	in	almost	all	EU	countries	(-11.9	per	cent)6.		The	 impact	 of	 the	 crisis	 on	 innovation	 systems	 and	 the	 defensive	 policies	implemented	by	governments	was	equally	significant.	In	short,	anticipating	what	we	will	say	later,	the	result	that	emerges	is	that	SE3	governments	did	not	carry	out	 any	 counter-cyclical	 action,	 unlike	 the	 Leader	 countries.	 In	 terms	 of	 both	resources	 invested	 in	 education	 and	 policies	 in	 support	 of	 research	 and	innovation,	 the	 public	 sector’s	 contribution	 suffered	 major	 cutbacks.	 The	slowdown	in	education	spending	is	evident.	While	in	the	pre-crisis	period	such	spending	 grew	 at	 a	 slightly	 faster	 rate	 than	 the	 EU	 average,	 in	 the	 following	period	 the	 opposite	 occurred.	 The	 annual	 rate	 of	 increase	 –	 calculated	 at	purchasing	power	parity	–	fell	from	4.2	per	cent	a	year	to	an	extremely	modest	0.7	per	 cent.	 In	 the	 Leader	 countries,	 on	 the	other	hand,	 a	 slight	 increase	was	registered,	from	3.9	to	4.1	per	cent.				
Table 2. Average annual growth rate of spending on R&D in some EU Countries, 2000-2015 (val. 
%). 
 Public sector  Business sector  All sectors 
  
2007-
2014 
2000-
2007   
2007-
2014 
2000-
2007   
2007-
2014 
2000-
2007 
European Union (28) 2,3 2,9  2,4 2,6  2,3 2,7 
Innovation Leaders  4,2 2,1  1,9 1,7  2,6 1,8 
         
SE3 (Southern Europe) 0,6 3,7   0,6 6,4   0,5 5,4 Source:	Eurostat	data;	unit:	Million	Purchasing	Power	Standard	(PPS)	at	2005	prices.	Note:	public	 sector	 spending	 includes	 that	which	Eurostat	 includes	 in	 the	 two	categories	of	"Government"	and	 "Higher	Education".	This	 is	a	proxy	value,	given	 that	not	all	 spending	on	R&D	in	the	education	sector	is	from	public	sources.		 The	 same	divergence	 is	 observed	 in	public	 spending	on	 research	 (Table	2).	Even	 though	 a	 slowdown	 is	 also	 visible	 in	 the	 field	 of	 commercial	 companies,	what	 is	 most	 striking	 is	 the	 specular	 action	 carried	 out	 by	 public	 institutions	(government	and	higher	education).	While	in	the	SE3	a	clear	fall	in	spending	on	
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R&D	 is	 registered	 –	 with	 the	 exception	 of	 the	 first	 two	 years	 of	 crisis	 (2008-2009)	–	in	the	Leader	countries,	the	reverse	happens:	the	average	annual	growth	rate	 doubled	 compared	 to	 the	 previous	 period,	 performing	 a	 clear	 counter-cyclical	function.	In	terms	of	per	capita	expenditure,	therefore,	the	gap	between	the	first	and	second	increased	primarily	in	the	public	sector	(Graph	2).	Although	much	 larger,	 in	 the	 business	 sector	 the	 spread	 remained	 broadly	 unchanged,	while	 in	 government	 and	 university	 fields	 there	 was	 an	 increase	 of	 up	 to	 6	percentage	 points.	 The	 overall	 effect	 was	 a	 clear	 setback	 in	 the	 catching-up	process	that	had	been	underway	before	the	crisis7.		Graph	 2.	 Comparison	 of	 per	 capita	 spending	 on	R&D	 in	 Southern	 European	 Countries	with	Innovation	Leader	Countries,	2000-2015	(Leader	Countries=	100).	
	Source:	Eurostat	data;	unit:	Purchasing	Power	Standard	(PPS)	per	inhabitant	at	constant	2005	prices.		Public	intervention	methods	also	changed.	Over	the	past	20	years,	the	policy	mix	 adopted	 by	 the	 Southern	 Europe	 countries	 has	 been	 focused	 on	 direct	support	to	companies	(European	Commission	2013b).	In	the	first	half	of	the	last	decade,	the	proportion	of	business	expenditure	on	R&D	covered	by	government	subsidies	was	considerably	higher	than	the	EU	average,	and	actually	three	times	that	of	the	Leader	countries.	In	the	manufacturing	sector,	nearly	40	per	cent	of	innovative	companies	received	some	public	funding;	twice	the	percentage	in	the	most	advanced	countries	(Graph	3).	This	pattern	has	changed	during	the	crisis.	In	 Southern	 Europe,	 direct	 support	 to	 companies	 has	 declined,	 while	 the	opposite	 has	 occurred	 in	 the	 Leader	 countries.	 In	 the	 latter,	 the	 percentage	 of	expenditure	deriving	from	public	support	has	not	changed	significantly,	but	the	number	of	companies	benefiting	from	some	sort	of	funding	has	increased	until	it	has	overtaken	the	number	of	companies	in	SE38.	
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	Graph	3.	Percentage	of	innovative	manufacturing	companies	that	have	received	some	form	of	public	funding,	2000-2012.	
	Source:	CIS	data	(2000;	2004;	2006;	2008;	2012).			These	 initial	 data	 evidence	 the	 highly	 negative	 impact	 of	 the	 crisis	 on	Southern	 Europe’s	 NIS.	 However,	 looking	 at	 company	 behaviour	 produces	 a	picture	 that	 is	 somewhat	 less	 bleak.	 CIS	 surveys,	 for	 example,	 reveal	 that	 the	percentage	of	innovative	manufacturing	companies	was	largely	in	line	with	the	EU	average9.	 Furthermore	–	 and	 this	 is	 the	datum	 that	we	want	 to	highlight	 –	this	percentage	increased	in	all	size	categories,	especially	in	the	first	years	of	the	crisis:	meanwhile,	the	opposite	occurred	in	other	EU	countries	(Table	3).		This	pattern	 is	 confirmed	by	 the	 results	of	 the	2014	Eurobarometer	 survey	(European	 Commission	 2014b).	 Italy	 is	 in	 first	 place	 and	 Portugal	 in	 third	 in	terms	of	the	number	of	companies	that,	between	2011	and	2013,	introduced	at	least	one	product	innovation,	with	percentage	values	(49	and	48)	well	above	the	EU	 average	 (37	per	 cent)	 and	 that	 of	 the	 innovation	 Leader	 countries	 (35	per	cent).	 Something	 of	 an	 anomaly	 therefore	 emerges.	 Despite	 all	 the	 problems	mentioned	 above,	 and	 the	 weakness	 of	 their	 NIS,	 the	 Southern	 European	companies	have	been	able	 to	 innovate	even	during	 the	 international	economic	crisis.	How	can	this	‘South	European	Paradox’	be	explained?								
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Table 3. Percentage of innovative manufacturing firms by size, 2006-2012-2014. 
 
10--49  
employees  
50--249 
employees  
250 employees 
and more  Total 
  2014 2012 2006   2014 2012 2006   2014 2012 2006   2014 2012 2006 
European 
Union (28) 
35.2 35.3 35.5  56.6 55.4 56.4  74.9 73.7 75.2  41.2 40.7 41.9 
Innovation 
leaders  
- 55.2 60.1  - 71.5 74.7  - 86.2 90.3  58.6 60.8 66.9 
SE3 33.1 35.9 33.5   61.6 63.2 58.8   85.2 83.7 79.3   38.1 40.4 37.7 
Source: CIS data (2006; 2012; 2014).  
Note: in the 2006 survey the EU average refers to 27 countries. 	To	provide	an	answer,	we	must	first	look	at	the	production	system.	In	the	SE3	economies,	manufacturing	employment	is	predominantly	concentrated	in	SMEs	and	 medium-low	 technology	 sectors,	 which	 account	 for	 over	 70	 per	 cent	 of	employment.	 This	 sub-specialization	 in	 high-tech	 sectors	 is	 confirmed	 by	 a	glance	at	exports,	of	which	the	share	of	high	technology	accounts	for	about	half	the	EU	 figure.	A	 first	explanatory	hypothesis	 therefore	ensues	 from	the	 typical	development	 pattern	 of	 these	 countries,	 which	 is	 associated	with	 a	 system	 of	incremental	 innovation.	 In	 a	 system	 of	 this	 kind,	 the	 operative	 logic	 is	 very	different	 from	radical	 regimes	–	 and	also	 those	 that	 are	 incremental	 but	more	science-based	–	because	the	production	sectors	in	which	enterprises	operate	are	less	 exposed	 to	 the	 ‘scientification’	 process	 of	 technology	 (Carlsson	 &	Stankiewicz	1991,	112).	The	 innovation	 methods	 of	 the	 Italian	 industrial	 districts	 illustrate	 this	different	 operative	 logic	 well.	 Such	 districts	 feature	 a	 widespread	 innovative	
capacity	(Marshall	1920;	Bellandi	1989)	mostly	based	on	forms	of	learning	from	experience	that	exploit	 the	practical	knowledge	acquired	by	the	manufacturers	(learning	 by	 doing)	 and	 users	 (learning	 by	 using)	 or	 arising	 from	 their	relationships	 (learning	 by	 interacting).	 This	 ‘distributed	 knowledge’	 makes	incremental	improvements	to	products	and	production	processes	possible,	thus	continuously	refining	 the	district’s	overall	 innovative	capacity.	 In	 light	of	 these	considerations,	 it	 is	 therefore	 not	 surprising	 that	 Southern	 Europe	 companies	have	been	able	to	innovate	despite	the	above-highlighted	shortcomings	in	their	NIS.	On	the	one	hand,	in	fact,	these	innovative	regimes	are	less	dependent	on	the	quality	of	education	and	research;	on	the	other	hand,	regional	and	local	systems	are	 able	 to	 off-set	 –	 albeit	 to	 a	 limited	 extent	 –	 the	 shortcomings	 of	 national	regulations.		Although	this	helps	partly	to	explain	the	 ‘South	European	Paradox’,	 this	 line	of	 reasoning	 is	 actually	 incomplete	 and	 –	 potentially	 –	 misleading.	 Not	 only	because	 the	 quality	 of	 the	 scientific-technological	 infrastructure	 and	 of	 the	training	system	also	 influences	 the	competitiveness	of	medium-low	technology	
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sectors,	 but	 above	 all	 because	 it	 yields	 a	 static	 picture	 of	 the	 situation:	 a	‘snapshot’	that	is	not	able	to	account	for	the	generative	dynamics	that	developed	during	the	crisis,	even	in	countries	that	suffered	a	serious	retrenchment	in	their	economies.	 In	 those	 years,	 in	 fact,	 it	 was	 above	 all	 the	 traditional	 model	 of	development	in	the	Southern	Europe	countries	that	came	under	challenge,	as	is	clearly	shown	by	employment	trends.	Between	2008	and	2014,	in	the	medium-low	and	low	technology	manufacturing	sectors,	the	decline	in	employment	was	20.2	 per	 cent,	 compared	 to	 9.0	 per	 cent	 in	medium-high	 and	 high	 technology.	Yet,	the	same	pattern	emerges	from	an	analysis	of	the	company	mortality	rate.		The	explanation	that	we	would	like	to	put	forward,	therefore,	integrates	with	the	 previous	 one	 (the	 model	 of	 specialization),	 drawing	 attention,	 along	Schumpeterian	lines,	to	the	‘creative	processes’	that	take	place	during	periods	of	crisis.	 On	 the	 one	 hand,	 there	 are	 processes	 of	 creative	 destruction,	 which	emphasise	 the	disappearance	and	replacement	of	 less	efficient	companies,	and	on	the	other,	processes	of	creative	accumulation,	which	focus	on	intensification	of	competitive	efforts	by	existing	companies.	There	is	substantial	evidence	that	both	of	these	processes	co-existed	during	the	crisis,	and	that	this	also	occurred	in	 other	 European	 countries	 (for	 example,	 in	 the	 case	 of	 Great	 Britain:	 see	Archibugi	&	Filippetti	2012;	Archibugi,	Filippetti	&	Frenz	2013).		Let	us	first	look	at	creative	destruction:	the	replacement	of	old	companies	that	can	no	 longer	compete	with	new	ones.	As	might	be	expected,	during	 the	crisis	this	 company	 replacement	 syndrome	 reached	 reasonably	 high	 levels.	 In	 the	manufacturing	sector,	the	mortality	rate	was	around	7.0	per	cent	per	year,	with	the	 disappearance	 –	 between	 2008	 and	 2014	 –	 of	 352,000	 companies.	 New	companies,	however,	sprang	up	even	during	the	hardest	years	of	the	recession,	albeit	at	a	slower	pace.	 In	 the	SE3,	 the	average	rate	was	5.2	per	cent	per	year:	below	the	EU	average	(6.8	per	cent)	but	slightly	higher	than	that	of	the	Leader	countries	(4.7	per	cent).	Many	innovative	start-ups	also	came	into	existence.	To	take	only	the	Italian	case,	it	is	worth	noting	that	in	the	space	of	only	a	few	years,	as	 a	 result	 of	 a	 law	 enacted	 in	 2012,	 around	 3,700	 innovative	 start-ups	were	registered	in	the	special	section	of	the	Company	Register,	the	majority	operating	in	 knowledge-intensive	 services	 (information	 technology,	 research,	 etc.),	 high-tech	 production	 and	 mechanical	 engineering.	 More	 generally,	 it	 has	 been	calculated	that	 in	the	medium	and	high	technology	sectors	around	15,000	new	companies	were	founded	(InfoCamere	2015;	Cerved	2014).	Turning	to	the	matter	of	creative	accumulation,	first	to	be	noted	is	an	increase	in	heterogeneity	in	companies’	performances.	To	take	the	example	of	Italy	once	again,	 the	 analyses	 conducted	 by	 the	 Central	 Statistical	 Institute	 emphasise	 a	widening	of	 the	productivity	gap	 compared	 to	 the	main	EU	countries,	but	 also	the	 high	 variety	 in	 performance	 of	 Italian	 companies,	 connected	 to	 their	disparate	 aptitudes	 for	 innovation	 (Istat	 2010,	 ch.	 2;	 Istat	 2015,	 pp.	 97ff	 and	116ff).	 Looking	 at	 the	 SE3	 as	 a	 whole,	 the	 data	 seem	 to	 suggest	 that	 some	companies	 intensified	their	 innovative	efforts,	adopting	a	pro-active	attitude	in	
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the	face	of	crisis.	And	this	was	also	due	to	the	dramatic	nature	of	the	crisis	itself.	Hence,	it	is	conceivable	that,	in	the	face	of	a	reduction	in	domestic	demand	and	policies	 of	 austerity,	 the	 ‘battle	 for	 survival’	 was	 perceived	 as	 a	 more	 radical	challenge	 in	 these	countries.	This	 is	also	shown	by	the	drastic	reduction	 in	 the	number	of	companies	in	comparison	to	what	happened	in	other	countries:	in	the	manufacturing	sector,	between	2008	and	2014,	active	enterprises	were	reduced	by	17.0	per	cent,	while	in	the	UE	by	3.3	per	cent.	One	 indicator	 of	 this	 pro-active	 attitude	 can	 be	 found	 in	 the	 increasing	resources	 allocated	 to	 R&D	 by	 manufacturing	 enterprises	 in	 the	 years	 of	 the	crisis.	In	fact,	between	2007	and	2014,	the	nominal	increase	in	the	SE3	was	not	very	different	from	the	EU	average:	18.2	per	cent	vs.	19.2	per	cent.	In	addition,	it	should	 be	 considered	 that	 the	 figures	 were	 affected	 by	 the	 particularly	 poor	performance	of	Spain	(+7.4	per	cent)	compared	to	Portugal	(+18.1	per	cent)	and,	especially	 Italy	 (+32.8	 per	 cent).	 The	 latter	 did	 even	 better	 than	 the	 Leader	countries	 (+24.1	 per	 cent).	 If	 we	 also	 take	 into	 account	 the	 reduction	 in	 the	number	of	active	companies,	what	catches	the	eye	is	the	growth	of	the	‘research	intensity’	underway	in	the	Southern	European	manufacturing	sectors.	Taking	as	100	the	resources	invested	in	R&D	in	2008	by	each	manufacturing	company,	in	2014	 this	 rose	 to	 133	 in	 the	 SE3,	 in	 contrast	 to	 a	 figure	 of	 126	 in	 the	 Leader	countries	 and	 a	 EU	 average	 of	 121.	 The	 gap	 is	 still	 formidable	 today,	 and	 yet	these	data	 suggest	 a	 selection	process	 that	 seems	 to	have	 raised	 –	 at	 least	 for	certain	companies	–	the	quality	of	competitive	strategies.	A	panel	survey	carried	out	on	more	than	400	Italian	companies	with	European	patents	in	the	high	and	medium-high	 technology	 sectors	 supports	 this	 hypothesis.	 The	 research	 was	carried	 out	 on	 the	 same	 companies	 in	 two	 different	 periods,	 covering	 their	performance	 over	 a	 six-year	 period	 (from	 2007	 to	 2012)	 and	 indicates	 good	performances,	even	during	the	crisis,	especially	by	companies	that	continued	to	invest	resources	in	research,	innovation	and	staff	training	(Ramella	2017).	In	 the	 light	 of	 these	 data,	 therefore,	 the	 ‘South	 European	 Paradox’	 can	 be	explained	in	two	ways,	neither	of	which	is	an	alternative	to	the	other.	On	the	one	hand,	 it	 can	be	 explained	by	 the	 reduction	 in	 the	number	of	 the	 least	 efficient	firms;	on	the	other,	by	the	arrival	of	new	innovative	companies,	and	an	increase	in	the	competitive	efforts	of	those	already	in	existence.	A	slight	confirmation	of	the	‘dynamic	and	creative’	character	of	the	crisis,	especially	in	the	private	sector,	is	 provided	by	 the	European	 ranking	 of	 the	 5,000	 companies	with	 the	 highest	growth	during	the	three-year	period	2011-13:	in	the	top	100,	one	third	consists	of	companies	from	the	SE3.	Italy	in	particular	stands	out,	occupying	second	place	(after	France)	for	the	number	of	companies	included	in	the	list	of	5,000:	768,	in	fact	(three	of	them	in	the	top	10),	equivalent	to	15	per	cent	of	the	total10.		So	far,	we	have	dealt	with	the	Southern	Europe	countries	by	regarding	them	as	a	whole,	but	we	should	not	let	this	obscure	the	diversity	in	their	economies,	especially	in	terms	of	size	and	productive	specialisations.	Italy,	for	example,	has	a	 greater	 industrial	 endowment:	 those	 employed	 in	 the	 manufacturing	
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industries	 are,	 in	 absolute	 terms,	 about	 twice	 as	 many	 as	 those	 in	 Spain	 and	more	than	five	times	those	in	Portugal.	Italy	also	enjoys	a	substantial	presence	in	the	medium-high	and	high	technology	sectors,	with	employment	figures	not	far	from	 the	 EU	 average	 (in	 2015	 33.3	 per	 cent	 vs.	 37.2	 per	 cent).	 Spain	 and,	especially,	 Portugal,	 however,	 are	 more	 specialised	 in	 low-tech	 sectors.	Differences	also	exist	in	terms	of	reaction	to	the	crisis.	In	this	respect,	it	should	be	noted	that,	as	regards	the	corporate	sector,	the	trajectory	followed	by	Spain	is	slightly	 divergent.	 In	 the	 years	 before	 the	 crisis,	 growth	 in	 investment	 and	employment	 proceeded	 at	 a	 much	 faster	 pace	 in	 Spain	 than	 in	 the	 other	 two	countries,	 and	 the	 same	 was	 true	 for	 the	 contraction	 registered	 over	 the	following	years,	including	the	area	of	innovation.		There	 are	 two	 further	 points	 that	 should	 be	 briefly	 mentioned	 before	conclusions	are	reached,	and	they	refer	to	all	SE3.	The	first	concerns	the	strong	emphasis	placed	by	many	analysts	on	exogenous	shocks	–	on	the	 international	crisis,	 in	other	words	–	 to	 explain	 the	difficulties	with	which	Southern	Europe	economies	are	struggling	today.	While	this	is	certainly	a	very	real	aspect,	it	is	an	interpretation	that	is	likely	to	obscure	the	fact	that	the	growth	paths	of	the	SEC3	had	begun	 to	diverge	 from	those	of	 the	more	advanced	economies	well	before	the	 explosion	 of	 the	 international	 crisis,	 as	 is	 clearly	 shown	 by	 the	 per	 capita	GDP	trend	over	the	past	15	years.	This	was	due	to	low	labour	productivity	rates:	between	2000	and	2007,	hourly	productivity	in	the	SE3	always	fell	below	the	EU	average,	with	an	average	annual	increase	that	was	fairly	modest	(0.7	per	cent	vs.	1.6	per	cent).	This	datum	indicates	a	development	strategy	based	on	a	‘low	road	to	 competitiveness’,	 centred	 on	 flexibilisation	 of	 the	 labour	 market	 and	reduction	of	costs,	rather	than	on	research,	advanced	training	and	the	creation	of	collective	goods	for	innovation.		The	 second	 point	 concerns	 the	 costs	 of	 this	 strategy,	 with	 respect	 to	 the	weakening	of	the	productive	and	innovative	capacity	of	the	SE3	economies.	This	point	 finds	clear	confirmation	when	the	most	 technologically	advanced	sectors	are	 considered,	 using	 Southern	 Europe’s	 most	 industrialized	 country	 as	 an	example.	As	is	well-known,	Italy	is	the	second	largest	manufacturing	country	in	the	 European	 Union.	 Perhaps	 less	 well-known	 is	 that	 this	 fact	 also	 applies	 to	medium-high	and	high	technology	sectors.	On	grouping	these	productive	sectors	together,	 it	 turns	out	 that,	 in	2014,	 Italy	was	 first	 in	EU	 in	 terms	of	number	of	companies,	 second	 in	 terms	 of	 volume	 of	 employment,	 and	 third	 in	 terms	 of	turnover	 (calculations	 based	 on	 Eurostat	 data).	 This	 indicates	 an	 extremely	respectable	productive	potential	that,	however,	does	not	seem	able	to	translate	into	 an	 equivalent	 capacity	 for	 innovation,	 as	 the	 data	 regarding	 patenting	clearly	highlight.	In	general,	Italian	patenting	intensity	is	fairly	low,	standing	at	around	 two-thirds	 of	 the	 EU	 average	 (69.7	 patents	 per	million	 inhabitants	 vs.	112.0),	but	it	is	the	country’s	performance	in	high-tech	sectors	that	is,	in	fact,	far	from	satisfactory,	where	it	manages	to	reach	only	a	third	of	the	EU	average	(5.0	
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vs.	 15.8	 in	 2013)11.	 The	 gap,	 in	 other	 words,	 increases	 precisely	 in	 the	 areas	where	NIS	deficiencies	have	a	stronger	and	more	negative	impact.			
Conclusions	The	impact	of	the	crisis	on	NIS	is	a	little-explored	issue	that	we	have	begun	to	address	with	this	work	by	focusing	on	the	situation	of	Italy,	Portugal	and	Spain.	We	 have	 looked	 at	 the	 behaviour	 of	 governments	 and	 companies	 in	 order	 to	inquire	 into	 the	 anti-conjunctural	 strategy	 undertaken	 on	 both	 sides.	 Our	analysis	has	made	use	of	indications	deriving	from	the	literature	on	the	varieties	of	 capitalism,	 from	 which	 we	 know	 that	 a	 link	 exists	 between	 the	 system	 of	regulation	 and	 the	 regime	 of	 innovation:	 incremental	 innovation	 is	 found	 in	coordinated	 market	 economies,	 and	 radical	 innovation	 in	 liberal	 market	economies.	 Italy,	 Portugal	 and	 Spain	 present	 the	 typical	 features	 of	 the	 first	model	 –	 with	 an	 under-specialisation	 in	 high-tech	 sectors	 –	 but	 they	 are	 also	characterised	by	other	elements	that	we	thought	useful	to	emphasise:	a	 lack	of	collective	 goods	 and	 input	 for	 innovation;	 under-investment	 in	 the	 training	 of	highly-skilled	 human	 capital;	 a	 predominant	 role	 played	 by	 the	 State	 with	respect	to	private	actors	in	relation	to	R&D	activities;	and	a	less	than	substantial	articulation	 of	 relations	 and	 cooperation	 between	 the	 actors	 participating	 in	innovative	processes.	These	reasons	also	explain	why	SE3	are	poor	performers	from	 the	 standpoint	 of	 innovation	 and	 display	 obvious	 weaknesses	 when	compared	to	the	more	advanced	situation	in	Europe.		From	 the	 point	 of	 view	 of	 institutional	 architecture,	 there	 is	 a	 clear	polarisation	between	SE3	and	the	European	Innovation	Leaders.	The	latter	have	‘highly	integrated’	NIS.	Their	levels	of	per	capita	expenditure	on	R&D	are	higher	than	the	EU	average.	They	are	firm-centred	thanks	to	substantial	investment	by	private	companies,	display	a	good	level	of	collaboration	among	actors,	and	have	a	 more	 science-based	 innovation	 regime. The	 NIS	 of	 the	 SE3,	 by	 contrast,	 are	‘weakly	integrated’	and	characterised	by	a	per	capita	expenditure	on	R&D	that	is	lower	 than	 the	 EU	 average.	 They	 are	 public-centred	 in	 orientation	 (although	public	expenditure	is	still	lower	than	that	of	the	Leaders	countries),	with	weaker	interconnections	 between	 actors	 and	 a	 tendentially	 empirical-oriented	 model,	where	development	is	nourished	by	forms	of	learning	based	on	experience.		With	the	lag	of	Italy,	Portugal	and	Spain	highlighted	in	these	areas	–	and	also	in	terms	of	quality	of	governance	and	in	conditions	of	‘doing	business'	–	we	then	focused	on	the	actual	behaviour	of	Southern	European	companies.	This	revealed,	with	an	especial	focus	on	the	Italian	case,	a	picture	that	was	less	gloomy:	some	of	these	 companies,	 in	 fact,	 despite	 the	weakness	 of	 their	 NIS	 and	 the	 economic	downturn,	 were	 still	 capable	 of	 producing	 innovation.	 The	 percentage	 of	innovative	companies	 in	the	SE3	–	with	the	exception	of	Spain	–	 is	 in	 line	with	the	 EU	 average	 and	 even	 increased	 during	 the	 crisis	 years.	 We	 therefore	provided	 some	 possible	 explanations	 for	 this	 apparent	 ‘South	 European	Paradox’.		
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The	 crisis	has	 certainly	had	a	negative	 impact	on	 the	economies	of	 the	SE3	and	 on	 their	 NIS.	 The	 governments	 were	 unable	 to	 carry	 out	 counter-cyclical	actions,	 as	 they	were	 able	 to	do	 in	 Leader	 countries:	 indeed,	 the	public	 sector	underwent	 a	 major	 retrenchment	 in	 terms	 of	 investments	 and	 policies	supporting	research	and	innovation.	This	meant	that	the	gap	between	these	two	groups	of	countries	regarding	the	use	of	public	resources	for	R&D	–	a	gap	that	in	the	 pre-crisis	 period	was	 growing	 smaller	 –	 once	 again	 began	 to	 increase	 (for	companies,	on	the	other	hand,	the	situation	remained	roughly	unchanged).	The	intervention	 methods	 of	 national	 governments	 also	 changed,	 and	 in	 opposite	directions.	 In	 the	 SE3	 the	 crisis	 brought	 about	 a	 huge	 reduction	 in	 a	model	 of	intervention	 that	 focused	 on	 direct	 transfers	 to	 companies.	 The	 opposite	occurred	 amongst	 the	 Leader	 countries,	 which	 instead	 significantly	 expanded	the	number	of	companies	able	to	benefit	from	some	form	of	public	support	(to	a	level	exceeding	that	of	the	SE3).		That	 being	 said,	 how	 can	 the	 ‘South	 European	 Paradox’	 be	 explained?	Productive	structure	is	one	of	the	first	responses	that	can	be	brought	into	play.	Manufacturing	employment	 in	 the	SE3	 is	predominantly	 concentrated	 in	SMEs	and	low-tech	sectors.	Since	this	model	is	associated	with	a	system	of	incremental	innovation,	 which	 is	 less	 dependent	 on	 education	 systems	 and	 research,	 this	might	explain	why	Southern	Europe	companies	are	still	able	to	innovate	despite	the	weaknesses	of	their	respective	NIS.	However,	this	explanation	does	not	make	it	possible	to	grasp	the	generative	dynamics	that	developed	during	the	crisis.	We	therefore	 integrated	 the	 previous	 hypotheses	 by	 taking	 two	 processes	 into	consideration:	creative	destruction	and	creative	accumulation.	These,	we	believe,	are	 of	 help	 in	 explaining	 this	 apparent	 paradox.	 The	 first	 process	 developed	through	a	reduction	in	the	number	of	less	efficient	firms	and	the	arrival	of	new	companies;	the	second,	through	the	intensification	of	competitive	and	innovative	efforts	 on	 the	 part	 of	 certain	 existing	 companies,	 which	 adopted	 a	 pro-active	attitude	 when	 faced	with	 the	 ‘battle	 for	 survival’	 imposed	 by	 the	 crisis.	 More	generally,	while	the	unfavourable	gap	between	the	SE3	and	other	EU	countries	is	still	 present,	 today	 there	 seems	 to	 be	 a	 higher	 variability	 in	 company	performance	and	propensity	to	innovation.		To	 summarise,	 the	 ‘South	 European	 Paradox’	 shows	 two	 sides	 of	 the	 same	coin.	On	the	one	hand,	in	fact,	the	weaknesses	in	the	SE3	NIS	have	reduced	the	resistance	 to	 the	 crisis	 of	 many	 enterprises	 and	 lowered	 the	 economic	 and	innovative	 potential	 of	 these	 economies.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 the	 harshness	 of	crisis	 in	 the	 SE3	 has	 also	 triggered	 more	 positive	 and	 ‘creative’	 processes,	inducing	the	more	resilient	and	dynamic	enterprises	to	multiply	their	innovative	efforts.			Before	 concluding,	 we	 would	 also	 like	 to	 put	 forward	 one	 last	 brief	consideration	on	the	role	of	the	crisis	in	relation	to	the	NIS	in	Italy,	Portugal	and	Spain:	 should	 it	 be	 seen	 only	 as	 a	 constraint	 or	 also	 as	 an	 opportunity?	Government	 policies	 that	 have	 prevailed	 so	 far	 –	 also	 taking	 into	 account	 the	
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constraints	 imposed	 by	 the	 EU	 –	 have	 focused	 on	 the	 reduction	 of	 public	expenditure	 rather	 than	 on	 research	 funding,	 advanced	 training	 and	 the	endowment	of	public	goods	 for	 innovation.	This	 ‘low	road	 to	competitiveness’,	however,	 is	 likely	 to	produce	a	 further	weakening	of	 the	SE3	economies.	 Italy,	for	example,	the	second	manufacturing	country	in	Europe,	displays	a	productive	potential	that	 is	unable	to	generate	a	corresponding	capacity	for	 innovation.	In	this	 regard,	 the	 crisis	 could	 have	 represented	 an	 appropriate	 moment	 for	 a	strategic	 rethinking	 of	 development	 policies,	 as	 occurred	 during	 the	 1990s	 in	South	 Korea	 and	 Finland,	 when	 the	 governments	 of	 those	 countries	 took	advantage	 of	 a	 period	 of	 economic	 crisis	 to	 increase	 and	 review	 the	 logic	 of	investments	 in	 training,	 R&D,	 technological	 infrastructure	 and	 other	 collective	goods	(OECD	2009).	To	date,	however,	the	Southern	Europe	countries	have	not	been	 able	 to	 meet	 the	 challenge	 posed	 by	 the	 crisis	 by	 interpreting	 it	 as	 an	opportunity	to	solve	the	structural	problems	of	their	NIS	and	to	promote	policies	for	innovation	and	long-term	growth.			
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                                            1	 That	 of	 ‘innovation’	 is	 a	 broad	 concept	 which	 in	 this	 paper	 is	 declined	 in	 an	 economic	sociology	 perspective.	 Given	 the	 complexity	 of	 the	 innovation	 process	 and	 the	 variations	among	different	types	of	innovation	(see	Ramella	2016),	it	may	be	useful	here	to	refer	to	the	rather	wide	definition	adopted	by	the	Oslo	Manual,	which	 inspired	the	 investigation	carried	out	 in	 the	 context	of	 the	EU:	 ‘An	 innovation	 is	 the	 implementation	of	a	new	or	 significantly	improved	 product	 (good	 or	 service),	 or	 process,	 a	 new	 marketing	 method,	 or	 a	 new	organisational	 method	 in	 business	 practices,	 workplace	 organisation	 or	 external	relations’(OECD/European	Communities	2005,	p.	46). 2	 In	 this	 article,	 as	 benchmarks	 for	 the	 analysis	 of	 the	 three	 SE3,	we	will	 consider	 the	 four	countries	 -	 Sweden,	 Denmark,	 Finland,	 Germany	 -	 that	 have	 confirmed	 themselves	 as	Innovation	Leaders	over	the	years,	thus	excluding	cases	like	the	Netherlands,	which	has	been	upgraded	 to	 the	 Leaders	 group	 only	 recently	 in	 2016,	 as	 well	 as	 the	 UK,	 which	 has	 been	classified	a	Leader	only	in	the	past. 3 The	 annual	 ‘Worldwide	 Governance	 Indicators’	 reports	 present	 a	 number	 of	 indicators	related	to	governance,	and	take	the	economies	of	a	total	of	215	states	into	account.	The	‘Doing	Business	2015’	report,	on	the	other	hand,	provides	a	comparative	overview	of	the	economies	of	189	countries	 involving	the	structures	and	practices	of	regulations	that	 foster/hinder	the	start-up	of	economic	activities	(World	Bank	2014,	2015). 4 All	the	data	commented	on	in	this	section	-	except	when	otherwise	specified	-	come	from	the	following	 Eurostat	 databases:	 	 http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/data/database	 and	http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/science-technology-innovation/data/database. 5	Unless	otherwise	indicated,	our	comparison	is	between	the	seven	years	preceding	the	crisis	and	the	next	seven	ones:	2000-2007	and	2007-2014. 6 Between	2008	and	2014,	Spain	recorded	a	sharp	decline	in	real	estate	activities	(-17.7	per	cent	 vs.	 EU	 +7.8	 per	 cent),	 construction	 (-59.7	 per	 cent	 vs	 -20.9	 per	 cent	 EU)	 and	mining	extraction	(-	40.0	per	cent	vs	-9.2	EU),	which	were	hit	by	the	real	estate	bubble	(for	a	detailed	reconstruction	of	the	effect	of	the	crisis	on	Spain,	see	OECD	2014a;	Royo	2008,	2013;	Bosco	&	Varney	2012;	Hamann	2013;	Molina	&	Godino	2013;	as	regards	Portugal,	OECD	2014b). 7	It	cannot	be	described,	however,	as	a	 ‘back-to-zero’	situation:	 in	2000	for	every	100	Euros	spent	 per	 capita	 on	 research	 in	 Innovation	 Leader	 countries,	 24.9	 Euros	were	 spent	 in	 the	SE3;	in	2007	this	amount	had	risen	to	31.5,	falling	back	to	28.3	in	2014	(source:	Eurostat).		 8 Referring	 to	 the	 CIS	 2014	 survey,	 the	 absence	 of	 data	 for	 Denmark	 does	 not	 make	 a	comparison	possible.	 9	 To	 render	 the	 data	 between	 the	 various	 Community	 Innovation	 Surveys	 comparable,	companies	were	considered	innovative	 if	 they	introduced	process	or	product	 innovations	 in	the	 three-year	 period	 of	 research.	 There	 are	 very	 significant	 variations	 among	 the	 SE3:	 in	Italy,	 innovative	manufacturing	companies	accounted	 for	45.9 per	cent,	 in	Portugal	 for	39.8	per	cent,	and	in	Spain	the	figure	went	down	to	28.5	per	cent.		 
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10 In	the	last	three	years	(2015-17)	the	average	number	of	the	SE3	companies	appearing	in	the	ranking	of	the	top	5,000	has	amounted	to	944,	that	is,	approximately	19	per	cent	of	the	total.	The	ranking	was	compiled	by	the	US	magazine	Inc.	(http://www.inc.com/inc5000eu). 
11 To	provide	a	more	concrete	idea	of	this	gap,	suffice	to	say	that	while	the	employees	in	high-tech	activities	(manufacturing	+	services)	 in	Germany	are	a	 little	more	than	double	those	 in	Italy,	the	volume	of	patenting	is	over	5	times	higher.	
